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NOTES
SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS AND
REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1986:
LIMITING JUDICIAL REVIEW TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD IN COST
RECOVERY ACTIONS BY THE EPA
On October 17, 1986, President Reagan signed the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) into law
after a three year reauthorizing process.' SARA is an amendment to
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA), the original "Superfund" law passed in
1980.2
SARA provides $8.5 billion to the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) over a five year span3 for the cleanup of inoperative
waste sites.4 The EPA is responsible for maintaining a National Pri-
orities List (NPL) of the most hazardous waste sites and for imple-
menting remedial programs for their cleanup. 5 After the EPA
places a site on the NPL, it has four options: (1) file suit and obtain
a court order compelling the responsible party to take the necessary
remedial action; (2) issue an administrative order requiring the re-
sponsible party to take the necessary remedial action; (3) enter into
an agreement with potentially responsible parties to perform a re-
1 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613 (1986) [hereinafter SARA].
2 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657)
[hereinafter CERCLA].
3 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1982 & Supp. 1988). Compared to the $1.6 billion pro-
vided to the EPA under CERCLA, SARA provides a tremendous increase in funds to the
EPA. These funds still are inadequate, however, because completion of the Superfund
program will require as much as $100 billion. H.R. REP. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 55 (1988).
4 Superfund II: A New Mandate, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2 (Feb. 13, 1987) [hereinafter
Superfund II: A New Mandate]. Congress initially granted statutory authority to the Presi-
dent, but the President delegated his authority to the EPA administrator. See Exec. Or-
der No. 12,316, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,237 (1981).
5 Van Cleve, Informal EPA Action Under CERCLA: Problems of Judicial Review, 31
WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 317 (1987). After placing a site on the NPL, either the
EPA or a private party conducts a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study, "further
categorized cleanup alternatives are identified, and a final plan for cleanup is deter-
mined." Gaba, Recovering Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs: The Private Cause of Action, 13
ECOLOGY L.Q. 181, 193 (1986).
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sponse action;6 or (4) expend money from the Hazardous Substance
Response Fund (Superfund) to clean up the site and then seek reim-
bursement from the potentially responsible party (PRP) .
In the event the EPA undertakes option four and brings a cost
recovery action against a potentially responsible party, the PRP can
challenge the remedy selected by the EPA. SARA's section 113(j),
however, limits judicial review of the EPA's selected remedy to the
administrative record. In addition, the court may require supple-
mentation of the administrative record in accordance with "other-
wise applicable principles of administrative law."8
This Note argues that Section 113(0) is an illegitimate means of
accomplishing a legitimate and laudable end.9 Section 113(j) de-
prives defendants of any meaningful right to challenge the EPA's
6 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) (Supp. 1988) gives the EPA authority to enter into such
agreements if the EPA "determines that such action will be done properly by such per-
son." Section 9622(a) further provides that whenever practical "and in the public inter-
est.., the [EPA] shall act to facilitate agreements ... that are in the public interest and
consistent with the National Contingency Plan in order to expedite effective remedial
actions and minimize litigation." Such an agreement is then entered as a consent decree
in the United States District Court. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)(A). Although this option is
the best available alternative for a party wanting to assure a cost effective cleanup, PRPs
may not be able to come to an agreement with the EPA. The EPA has failed to en-
courage negotiated settlements in the past. Roberts, Allocation of Liability Under CERCLA:
A "Carrot and Stick" Formula, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 601, 609 (1987). "[EPA] negotiations
have been exclusively power based, offering no incentives to settle. Buttressed byjudi-
cial decisions consistently upholding EPA's position, the agency in effect has issued an
ultimatum of'settle on the government's terms or litigate and lose.'" Id., quoting An-
derson, Negotiation and Informal Agency Action: The Case of Superfund, 1985 DUKE LJ. 261,
320.
7 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a)(1982), § 9604(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1988). Out of the 110
sites where the EPA selected remedies, potentially responsible parties financed response
efforts at only 52 of those sites. 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1221 (Nov. 21, 1986) (quoting
EPA figures). The EPA financed response efforts with the Fund in most emergency ac-
tions. Id. Congress intended that the EPA limit use of the Superfund to emergency
situations, and therefore favored PRP funding. Lyons, Deep Pockets and CERCLA: Should
Superfund Liability Be Abolished?, 6 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 283-84 (1986-1987); see 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1988) (the President may allow a responsible party to per-
form cleanup if they can do so properly and promptly); 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(4) (Supp.
1988) (the President can use Fund resources only if there is a public health or environ-
mental emergency and no other party can respond in a timely manner); see also Lone
Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 600 F. Supp. 1487, 1490 (D.NJ. 1985) (CERCLA did not
intend for the EPA to act where responsible parties have agreed to take the proper
action).
8 Lone Pine Steering Comm., 600 F. Supp. at 1490.
9 This Note does not criticize the broad liability provisions of CERCLA. It instead
focuses on the inequities of cost recovery actions when judicial review is limited to the
administrative record and PRPs have little control over the appropriate remedy selected
for the site. For an excellent discussion on the liability provisions of CERCLA (as
amended by SARA), see Lyons, supra note 7, at 285-312. It is important to note that a
PRP's liability is not dependent upon a finding of a causal link between a PRP's acts and
the harm suffered. Id. at 309.
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selected remedy, despite the enormous liability exposure.' 0 This
Note advances two reasons in support of this conclusion. First, lim-
iting judicial review to the administrative record in a cost recovery
action gives the EPA enormous unchecked power,1' while depriving
PRPs of the right to cross-examine EPA personnel involved in the
remedial selection process. 12 Second, because the judiciary is ill-
equipped to analyze the complex data presented in an administra-
tive record largely compiled by the EPA, judicial review is merely
formalistic, and offers no substantive protection for a defendant's
rights. ' 3
This Note first discusses the purpose and history of CERCLA
10 Although section 104 states that the EPA shall not continue a response action
after spending $2 million or after 12 months have elapsed, this cap has not limited the
liability of defendants. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(1) (Supp. 1988). EPA response actions in-
volve a two step process. Under section 104, Congress authorizes the EPA to utilize
Superfund money to clean up a site. Once the EPA performs a cleanup, the EPA can
then sue for reimbursement under section 107. Every court deciding the issue has held
that the liability provisions of section 107(a) are seperate and independent from the
requirements of section 104. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F.
Supp. 162, 207 (D.C. Mo. 1985); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical Co., 579
F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1336 (E.D. Pa. 1983); State ex rel. Brown v.
Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1315 (N.D. Ohio 1983); United States v. Reilly Tar &
Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1118 (D. Minn. 1982). In other words, failure to abide
by the statutorily prescribed limit cannot be pleaded as a defense in a cost recovery
action. "The restrictions contained in § 104 are intended to protect the integrity of the
Superfund and not limit the government's replenishing it by recovery from responsible par-
ties." Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1336 (emphasis added). Additionally, there are exceptions
to the $2 million/12 month cap as more fully discussed infra at note 96. As a result of
CERCLA's broad liability provisions, "very few defendants can afford to ultimately bear
the large and completely unexpected liabilities imposed by CERCLA.... In many cases,
failure [of other parties sharing or assuming adjudicated liability] will leave [defend-
ants] no alternative but bankruptcy." Light, A Defense Counsel's Perspective on Superfund, 15
ENVTL L. REP. (Envt'l L. Inst.) 10,203, 10,206 (July 1985).
11 The Washington, D.C. law firm of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius wrote a memoran-
dum for clients discussing the impact of SARA on American industry. In this memoran-
dum, written principally by ex-EPA deputy administrator John Quarles, the authors
expressed concern for the "dictatorial" government power over the cleanup process. 17
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 29 at 1181 (Nov. 14, 1986). The memorandum also cautioned
that SARA "thoroughly undercut the ability of a private party to successfully challenge
decisions of the government through judicial review .. ." Id. at 1182 (citing memoran-
dum). In addition, the report claimed that a client could only avoid runaway costs and
the "Cadillac approach" of the EPA to remedial action decisions by agreeing with the
EPA that private parties perform the Remedial Investigation Feasibility Study. Id. Dur-
ing the House debate on CERCLA, Congressman Stockman also expressed concerned
over the EPA's enormous power. 126 Cong. Rec. 26,759 (1980). He alleged that H.R.
7020 would make the EPA "the czar over every hazardous waste site in the entire coun-
try." Id.
12 Record review under SARA only applies to EPA remedy selection decisions and
not to the implementation process. Light, When EPA Makes a Superfund Mistake: Judicial
Review Problems Under SARA, 17 ENVTL L. REP. 10,148, 10,153 (May 1987) (asserting that
the implementation process does not constitute "agency action").
13 See infra notes 116-27 and accompanying text.
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and SARA. It then defines the parameters of an administrative rec-
ord and discusses the appropriate scope of judicial review under
SARA. Section II next emphasizes four criticisms of procedure and
judicial review under SARA. Finally, this Note concludes by arguing
that one way to accord PRPs due process, and to place a check on
irrational agency behavior, is to provide PRPs with the right to
cross-examine, at the trial level, EPA personnel involved in the re-
medial selection process. PRP cross-examination will achieve two
goals: (1) protection of the due process rights of important Ameri-
can industries,1 4 and (2) avoidance of overzealous remedial actions
which involve the inefficient1 5 expenditure of resources and labor
that could be used to clean up other hazardous waste sites posing a
threat to human health and the environment.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Pre-SARA: Purpose and History of CERCLA
In recognition of the tragic consequences of improper, negli-
gent, and reckless hazardous waste disposal practices known as the
"inactive hazardous waste site problem,"' 6 Congress began work on
CERCLA in the late 1970s. Although Congress recognized the
growth of the chemical industry and the dangers of hazardous
waste, 17 it did not fully comprehend the problem's magnitude.', In
1979, prior to the passage of CERCLA, both the EPA and Congress
believed that a site could be adequately cleaned up by "scraping a
few inches of soil off the ground." 19 At that time, the EPA estimated
14 The fifth amendment to the Constitution provides that no person shall "be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
The fifth amendment is applied to the states through the fourteenth amencment. Sev-
eral articles have focused on the due process rights of industries when the EPA seeks an
administrative order under section 106. See, e.g., Glass, Superfund and SARA: Are There
Any Defenses Left?, 12 HARV. ENVrL. L. REV. 385, 444 (1988) (setting forth due process
arguments for PRPs in section 106 actions); Cross, Procedural Due Process under Superfund,
1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 919 (arguing that section 106 actions violate due process).
The defendants in hazardous waste litigation are "the key industries of the modem
American postwar industrial economy, including chemical manufacturing, petroleum re-
fining, pesticide production, plastics manufacturing, electronics production, and min-
ing." Lyons, supra note 7, at 274-75. Given this country's dependence on these
industries, there is a compelling interest in giving them an ability to protect against
unnecessarily expansive remedial actions taken by the EPA. This is especially true in
light of the new, stringent cleanup standards under section 122 of SARA which increase
cleanup costs even more. Id. at 281-82; see infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
15 42 U.S.C. § 9621(a) (Supp. 1988) requires the EPA to select a remedial plan
"which provide[s] for [a] cost effective response."
16 H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17 (1980).
17 Id. at 18-19.
18 H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 3, at 54.
19 Id.
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that between 1,200 and 2,000 sites posed a serious risk to public
health. 20 The EPA also estimated that it needed between $13.1 and
$22.1 billion to clean up all of these dangerous hazardous waste
sites. 21 Politicians and professionals alike had little knowledge re-
garding the cleanup process and the financial resources required. 22
Thus, Congress passed CERCLA on December 11, 1980,23 but pro-
vided the EPA with only $1.6 billion for the cleanup of 400 sites.24
By 1985, however, approximately 10,000 sites required
cleanup. 25 At present, Congress estimates that the EPA needs $100
billion to solve the hazardous waste problem. 26 In addition, the
EPA's average cost of cleaning up a site in 1988 was between $21
million to $30 million. 27
The main purpose of CERCLA is to protect the health and envi-
ronment from the dangers posed by inactive hazardous waste
sites. 28 CERCLA accordingly requires the EPA to begin the cleanup
of hazardous waste sites in a timely fashion. 29 However, recognizing
that there was a "shortage of cleanup resources and insufficient
legal remedies for collecting from owners of abandoned or inactive
waste sites" under the old legislation,30 CERCLA implicitly estab-
20 H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 16, at 18.
21 Id. at 20. These estimates assume responsible parties will finance 40-60% of the
cleanup costs. Lyons, supra note 7, at 281. Therefore, the EPA expects the actual
cleanup costs for all of these sites to be much higher. Id.
22 This can be seen by comparing the $1.6 billion actually allocated with the current
estimate of $100 billion.
23 See generally Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM.J. ENV-rL. L. 1 (1982) (dis-
cussing the history of CERCLA). CERCLA is a combination of both H.R. 7020 and
S.1480. Id.
24 H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 3, at 54.
25 Id. at 55. This is equivalent to an average of 23 sites per Congressional district.
26 Id.
27 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 2454 (April 15, 1988); see also 18 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 48, at 2363 (Mar. 25, 1988).
28 H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 16, at 1. CERCLA was, in part, a reaction to
public pressure resulting from the high publicity given to hazardous waste sites, includ-
ing Love Canal. The legislative history of CERCLA expressly mentions the incidents at
Love Canal. See id. at 19-20. At Love Canal, the government had to evacuate 230 fami-
lies from the area due to the dangers posed by hazardous substances released into the
air, soil, and water from an improperly maintained waste site. Id. at 19. The health data
at Love Canal indicated increased miscarriages and birth defect rates. Id. At the time
Congress was considering the passage of CERCLA, cleanup costs at Love Canal ex-
ceeded $27 million. Id. at 20; but see Grad, supra note 23, at 25 ("Senator Moynihan...
introduced a detailed chronology of the Love Canal events, a gesture which had the
quality of futility because nothing in the provisions of the substitute bill would aid the
Love Canal victims, though indeed it might prevent other situations of that kind in the
future.").
29 See United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("[CERCLA]
is intended to facilitate the prompt clean-up of hazardous waste dump sites.").
30 Grad, supra note 23, at 8.
[Vol. 74:11521156
1989] LIMITING JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER SARA 1157
lished a standard of strict liability for potentially responsible parties
(PRPs).3 1 CERCLA also established a cleanup fund (Superfund) by
imposing taxes on the petrochemical, inorganic chemical, and oil
industries.32 The industries most benefitted by the use of such
wastes therefore suffer the burden of funding cleanup.3 3
One of the principle criticisms of CERCLA is the manner of its
passage. It was a "hastily assembled bill,"3 4 containing many tech-
nical flaws,3 5 which passed in the House after a very limited de-
bate.36 Due to the inadequate knowledge of the effects of hazardous
waste on the environment in 1980, however, CERCLA was perhaps
"the best that could be done at the time." 37
B. Purpose and History of SARA
Beginning in 1984, Congress turned its attention to amending
CERCLA.38 During the first five years of CERCLA, problems arose
concerning improper political conduct by EPA officials in the haz-
ardous waste division.3 9 In addition, Congress became aware that
the hazardous waste problem was larger in scope than previously
thought.40 In order to deal with these problems, Congress sought
to define cleanup standards, 41 to expand the resources available to
the EPA to conduct cleanups and investigations, 42 and to clarify the
31 See H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 3, at 74. Many courts have held that CERCLA
imposes strict liability on all parties falling within the terms of section 107(a)(1-4). See,
e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); United States
v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 62 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844 (W.D. Mo. 1984)
(strict liability for site response costs imposed on transporter and generator under CER-
CLA), rev'd on other grounds, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
32 Grad, supra note 23, at 12.
33 See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 72 (1980) ("Financing the Fund pri-
marily from fees paid by industry is the most equitable and rational method of broadly
spreading the costs of past, present and future releases of hazardous substances .....
34 Grad, supra note 23, at 2.
35 Id. at 34.
36 Id. at 1.
37 Id. at 2.
38 Superfund II: A New Mandate, supra note 4, at 6.
39 Congress conducted an investigation of the EPA and dicovered that EPA officials
had diverted cleanup funds from some Superfund sites in order to increase the political
fortunes of Republican Senate candidates. Id. at 5. The investigation eventually led to
the resignation of Anne Burford, the EPA Administrator, the imprisonment of Rita La-
velle, EPA's top hazardous waste official, and the resignation of more than 20 senior
agency officials. Id.
40 Id
41 Id. at 6. The new cleanup standards are found in section 121. That section pro-
vides in pertinent part: "Remedial actions in which treatment which permanently and
significantly reduces the volume, toxicity, or mobility of the hazardous substances, pol-
lutants, and contaminants is a principal element, are to be preferred over remedial ac-
tions not involving such treatment." 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1) (Supp. 1988).
42 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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EPA's authority.43
To effectuate these goals, Congress had to confront a funda-
mental policy question: "[h]ow to ensure in the future that there
are adequate resources, and to see that past, thoroughly repudiated,
mismanagement problems are behind us."'44 Congress, in short,
had to restore public confidence in the program. Admittedly, CER-
CLA had failed. Political pressure to give high priority status to
every site guaranteed this failure. 45 In addition, unrealistic time
schedules, standards impossible to enforce, and program require-
ments exceeding funding contributed to CERCLA's failure.46
Although SARA makes several key changes -to CERCLA,47 this
Note focuses on section 1136).48 This section provides that judicial
review of the Administrator's selection of a response action shall be
based solely on the administrative record. 49 One purpose of this
section "is to ensure that the Administrator's decision is based on
adequate information to which the public and potentially responsi-
ble parties have access." 50 Another objective is to provide the pub-
lic with a clearly articulated basis for a remedial decision.5 1 The
administrative record therefore is open to scrutiny by potentially re-
sponsible parties and the public. 52
By limiting judicial review in section 113(j), Congress hoped to
expedite the reviewing process by precluding courts from consider-
ing information and criteria not used in the remedy-selection pro-
cess. 53 Congress further assumed that limiting judicial review to the
administrative record would encourage both the PRP's and the pub-
lic to participate actively in the development of the record prior to
remedy selection. 54
Under section 121(b) of SARA, the EPA must choose a reme-
43 H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 3, at 54.
44 Id. at 55.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 56.
47 For a useful summary of changes to CERCLA, see generally Superfund 11. A New
Mandate, supra note 4.
48 Section 113()(1) states:
In any judicial action under this chapter, judicial review of any issues con-
cerning the adequacy of any response action taken or ordered by the
President shall be limited to the administrative record. Otherwise appli-
cable principles of administrative law shall govern whether whether any
supplemental materials may be considered by the court.
42 U.S.C. § 96130)(1) (Supp. 1988).
49 See id. Prior to the amendment of CERCLA, Congress did not address the appro-
priate scope of judicial review issue.
50 H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 3, pt. III, at 24.
51 Id., pt. I, at 139.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 81.
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dial plan that "permanently and significantly reduces the volume,
toxicity or mobility" of hazardous substances.55 Under CERCLA,
there were no such statutory cleanup standards, and response action
teams often transported Superfund waste off-site without treat-
ment.56 Due to SARA's new and stringent cleanup standards, the
cost of cleanups has increased dramatically.57 Although SARA, like
CERCLA, requires that remedial actions be cost effective, 58 the EPA
is now unsure how to apply this requirement under SARA's more
rigorous cleanup standards. 59 In any case, a reviewing court must
uphold the EPA's selection of a remedy unless the administrative
record indicates that the remedy decision was arbitrary and capri-
cious, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 60
SARA also provides for the participation of interested persons
in the development of the administrative record. 61 The Administra-
tor must give PRP's notice of remedial plans and a reasonable op-
portunity for comment and for a public meeting. The Administrator
must then respond to comments and criticisms and must supply a
statement of the basis and purpose of the selected action.62 The
purpose of this section is to provide procedural protections to the
55 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1) (Supp. 1988) (effective Oct. 17, 1986). For the text of
section 12 1, see supra note 41. The lack of new technology makes it difficult, however,
for the EPA to establish permanent treatments at hazardous waste sites. 18 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 11, at 774 (July 10, 1987). CERCLA also requires the EPA to publish a
National Contingency Plan (NCP) in order to "establish procedures and standards for
responding to releases of hazardous substances, pollutants and contaminants." 42
U.S.C. § 9605 (1982 & Supp 1988). The NCP requires the EPA to study the site,- de-
velop alternative cleanup plans, and select a cleanup strategy from among the alterna-
tives discussed. 40 C.F.R. § 300.61-300.71 (1985) (Subpart F-Hazardous Substance
Response).
56 See Superfund II: A New Mandate, supra note 4, at 2-3.
57 See 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 778-79 (Sept. 26, 1986).
The cleanup standards called for in SARA "would drive the cost of a superfund
cleanup from its present average of $9 million per site to between $30 million and $60
million per site." Id. at 779. Moreover, when long term costs such as groundwater
cleanup are factored in, cleanup costs may total between $300 million and $600 million.
Id.
58 SARA provides: "The President shall select a remedial action that is protective
of human health and the environment, that is cost effective, and that utilizes permanent
solutions.. ." 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1) (Supp. 1988).
59 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 8 at 667 (June 19, 1987).
60 42 U.S.C. § 96130)(2) (Supp. 1988).
61 42 U.S.C. § 9613(k)(2)(B) (Supp. 1988). Prior to the 1986 amendments, there
were no provisions in CERCLA for the participation of interested parties in the remedy
selection process. The EPA could begin cleanup at a site without giving notice to, or
consulting with, potentially responsible parties. See United States v. Dickerson, 640 F.
Supp. 448, 453 (D. Md. 1986) ("There is nothing in the plain language of the statute
imposing a mandatory duty upon the government to consult with private parties before
undertaking response actions.").
62 42 U.S.C. § 9613(k)(2)(B) (Supp. 1988). The public comment period follows
publication of the RI/FS and precedes the agency's selection of a remedy.
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public, and to safeguard the PRP's right to participate in the devel-
opment of the administrative record. 63
C. Limiting Judicial Review to the Administrative Record
1. What is the Administrative Record?
The first step in most judicial review proceedings is defining the
administrative record. 64 The agency, in this instance the EPA, com-
piles the documents relevant to the hazardous site and then certifies
this record to the court.65 Although SARA prescribes the minimum
information that the EPA must include in the Administrative Rec-
ord,6 6 this system of certification necessarily requires the agency to
make subjective judgments as to what other relevant documents
ought to be included in the record.67 Given the infinite dimensions
to an environmental problem and the extensive labor force com-
monly involved in the decision-making process,68 the agency may
overlook or erroneously exclude relevant documents. 69
Although SARA mandates a deferential standard of review,70
the record must be adequate for the court to examine the basis of
the agency's decision. For example, the Supreme Court held in Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe 71 that judicial review of
63 42 U.S.C. § 9613(k)(2)(A) (Supp. 1988) (effective Oct. 17, 1986).
64 McMillan & Peterson, The Permissible Scope of Hearings, Discovery, and Additional Fact
Finding DuringJudicial Review of Informal Agency Action, 1982 DUKE LJ. 333, 340.
65 Litigants commonly argue over whether an administrative record is complete,
and courts may differ in their resolution of this factual question. Id.
66 Under section 113(k)(2)(B), the administrative record must include, at a mini-
mum, the comments submitted by potentially responsible parties and interested per-
sons, information developed and received at the public hearing, and the EPA's
responses to significant comments, criticisms, and data submitted in both oral and writ-
ten presentations. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(k)(2)(B) (Supp. 1988). In addition, the record
should include a brief analysis of the EPA's remedial plan and the alternative plans con-
sidered by the EPA prior to its final remedy selection. Id.
67 Id. at 341. For example, in Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th
Cir. 1973) the EPA argued that the administrative record should include only two docu-
ments: (1) the EPA order of approval of state plans to implement federal ambient air
quality standards under the Clean Air Act, and (2) the state plan itself. Id. at 505. The
court held that restricting its review to these two documents would be a "meaningless
gesture" and simply "a game of blind man's bluff." Id. at 507. The court, therefore,
ordered the administrator to certify the full record including the EPA's reasoning and
analysis. Id. The whole record included "the record of expert views and opinions, the
technological data and other relevant material, including the state hearings, on which
the Administrator himself acted." Id. Furthermore, the court asked the administrator
to explain its reasoning and analysis. Id.
68 Oakes, TheJudicial Role in Environmental Law, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 498, 502 (1977).
69 McMillan & Peterson, supra note 64, at 341. A litigant, however, may challenge
the sufficiency of the record in court. See Appalachian Power Co., 477 F.2d at 507 (the
court declared it premature to remand for supplementation of the record until the ad-
ministrator certified the record).
70 42 U.S.C. § 96130)(2) (Supp. 1988).
71 401 U.S. 402 (1971). In Overton Park, the Court had to decide whether to uphold
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agency action under an arbitrary and capricious standard had to be
based on the "whole record" compiled by the agency.72 While the
Overton Court recognized the benefits of terse agency explanations,
it determined that courts need a complete administrative record to
carry out a "searching and careful" analysis of an issue.73
In response to Overton's "whole record" requirement, the
courts have developed four guidelines for determining the proper
scope of the administrative record:
First, the record should include all documents the agency consid-
ers rather than only those on which the agency relies. Second ....
the record should include all documents considered by the agency
employees whose input reached the decisionmaker .... Third,
raw data that is bona fide confidential business information ordi-
narily need not be included in the administrative record. Fourth,
deliberative intra-agency memoranda and staff reports should or-
dinarily be excluded from the administrative record. 74
Overton held that if the record does not disclose "the factors...
considered or the [agency's] construction of the evidence," 75 addi-
tional supplementation is appropriate. Supplementation is particu-
larly useful when the subject matter is complex. 76 The courts use
this additional information to determine the substance of the agency
decision and how the agency reached this decision, but not to evalu-
ate the merits of that decision.77 This distinction often is difficult to
make.78 When the court probes the basis for an agency's decision,
there will inevitably be some probing of the validity of that
judgment.79
the Secretary of Transportation's approval of a highway project. In support of its ac-
tions, the agency submitted explanatory affidavits to the court. Id.
72 Id. at 419.
73 Id. at 415-16.
74 McMillan & Peterson, supra note 64, at 341-42; see Pierson v. United States, 428
F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1977) (discussing guidelines 1 and 2); Atchison, Topeka & Sante
Fe Ry. v. Alexander, 480 F. Supp. 980, 995 (D.D.C. 1979) (discussing guideline 3);
Madison County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 662 F.2d 393, 395
n.3 (8th Cir. 1980) (discussing guideline 4).
75 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420.
76 McMillan & Peterson, supra note 64, at 352.
77 Id.
78 Id. For example, the court in Camp v. Pitts, 463 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1972), vacated,
411 U.S. 138 (1973), determined that the Comptroller of the Currency failed to articu-
late adequately the basis for its denial of respondents application for a National bank
charter; consequently the court ordered de novo review of the denial. Id. at 633. By
ordering de novo review, the court, in essence, authorized judicial review of the merits
of the denial. The Supreme Court, however, vacated the judgment, claiming the record
was adequate, and noted that even if it were not, the proper remedy was to order supple-
mentation of the record rather than to engage in de novo review. 411 U.S. 138, 142-43
(1973).
79 McMillan & Peterson, supra note 64, at 356.
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2. What is the Appropriate Scope of Review?
To provide the EPA with more flexibility than that accorded
under CERCLA,80 SARA mandates a deferential standard of re-
view."' Under Section 113(j)(2), "the Court shall uphold the Presi-
dent's decision in selecting the response action unless the objecting
party can demonstrate, on the administrative record, that the deci-
sion was arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance
with law."'8 2 In Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, the court explained the nature of
review under an arbitrary and capricious standard:
There is no inconsistency between the deferential standard of re-
view and the requirement that the reviewing court involve itself in
even the most complex evidentiary matters .... The close scru-
tiny of the evidence is intended to educate the court. It must un-
derstand enough about the problem confronting the agency to
comprehend the meaning of the evidence relied upon and the evi-
dence discarded; the questions addressed by the agency and those
bypassed; the choices open to the agency and those made. The
more technical the case, the more intensive must be the court's
effort to understand the evidence, for without an appropriate un-
derstanding of the case before it the court cannot properly per-
form its appellate function.8 3
In addition, PRPs cannot obtain judicial review of the EPA's ac-
tions under section 104 until the EPA completes the cleanup activ-
ity,8 4 and only then if the government seeks reimbursement for
cleanup expenses.8 5 The House Committee recognized that pre-en-
forcement review of agency action would delay cleanups, increase
response costs, and discourage settlements.86 The courts consist-
ently hold that the opportunity to object fully to an EPA action after
the remedial process protects the due process rights of a PRP.8 7
80 H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 3, at 56.
81 42 U.S.C. § 9613j)(2) (Supp. 1988). Congress modeled the judicial review pro-
visions of many statutes, including SARA, after the judicial review provisions of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA). 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)
[hereinafter cited as APA]. This model provides the courts with a well-defined frame-
work for reviewing agency action. H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 3, at 25.
82 42 U.S.C. § 9613j)(2) (Supp. 1988). Id. at 36.
83 541 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
84 Section 104 action allows the EPA to use the Superfund to finance cleanup. Re-
imbursement procedures against responsible parties under section 107 often follow
cleanup activities. See supra note 11.
85 Van Cleve, supra note 5, at 330.
86 H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 3, at 58.
87 See United States v. Dickerson, 660 F. Supp. 227 (M.D. Ga. 1987) (holding pre-
enforcement review of the EPA's remedy selection as unnecessary); Lone Pine Steering
Comm. v. EPA, 600 F. Supp. 1487, 1498-1499 (D.NJ. 1985) ("I see no reason why
plaintiffs cannot raise as a defense in a cost recovery action every objection to the [Rec-
ord of Decision] which they could legitimately raise in a judicial proceeding at this
time."); United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 104 F.R.D. 405 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (hold-
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II
ANALYSIS
A. Four Criticisms of Procedure and Judicial Review Under
SARA
A potentially responsible party8 8 could make four valid criti-
cisms of procedure and judicial review under SARA: (1) limiting
judicial review to the administrative record is prejudicial to PRPs;
(2) courts cannot engage in meaningful judicial review because of a
lack ofjudicial expertise; (3) SARA's procedural requirements fail to
encourage cost-effective behavior by the EPA; and (4) SARA's hear-
ing requirements do not satisfy due process. Other considerations,
such as fundamental fairness and efficiency, both economic and ad-
ministrative, argue against limiting judicial review to the administra-
tive record under SARA.
1. Limiting Judicial Review To An Administrative Record is
Prejudicial To Potentially Responsible Parties
a. Judicial Review Based On An Administrative Record Produces
Inequitable Results In Environmental Cases Where
Congress Has Mandated Broad Liability Provisions
And An Arbitrary And Capricious Standard
CERCLA holds defendants jointly and severally liable for all
cleanup costs at a site.8 9 In addition, the EPA can hold a party liable
for cleanup costs even if that party's contribution to the site was
minimal,90 and even if the EPA cannot show that a party's contribu-
ing CERCLA does not provide for judicial review until the EPA sues to recover its
cleanup costs). See also Van Cleve, supra note 5, at 330-32.
88 Section 107(a) of CERCLA identifies four classes of persons that courts can hold
liable for response costs: 1) the owner or operator of a facility; 2) past owners or opera-
tors during the period of hazardous waste disposal; 3) persons who arranged for dispo-
sal of hazardous substances at the facility; and 4) persons who accepted any hazardous
substances for transportation to a facility from which there was a release of hazardous
waste. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4) (1982 & Supp. 1988). Section 101(21) of CERCLA
defines "person" as "an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consor-
tium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality,
commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42 U.S.C. § 9601
(21)(1982 & Supp. 1988).
89 SARA did not include a provision establishing joint and several liability because
the Senate preferred to rely on preexisting common law and prior statutory law. Grad,
supra note 23, at 22. See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808
(S.D. Ohio 1983) ("the scope of liability and term joint and several liability were deleted
to avoid a mandatory legislative standard applicable in all situations which might pro-
duce inequitable results in some cases.... The deletion was not intended as a rejection
ofjoint and several liability.").
90 United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1333 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("[T]he release
which results in the incurrence of response costs and liability need only be of 'a' hazard-
ous substance and not necessarily one contained in the defendant's waste.").
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tion presented an actual hazard.9 1
In a section 107 cost-recovery action following a cleanup under
section 104, the EPA seeks reimbursement for all response costs. 92
Response costs may include litigation costs and attorneys' fees, gov-
ernment salaries, monitoring costs, costs of planning and imple-
menting a remedial action, future response costs, and prejudgment
interest.93 Given SARA's new cleanup standards requiring perma-
nent response action, cleanup alone may cost up to $600 million per
site.9 4 Litigation expenses also may reach astronomical levels.9 5
Consequently, each defendant in a section 107 cost recovery action
faces enormous liability exposure. 9 6
Given this potential liability exposure and SARA's stringent lia-
bility provisions, Congress' adoption of the traditional administra-
tive rule limiting judicial review of agency action to the
administrative record is inequitable. Under SARA's judicial review
provisions, courts only can grant relief to a defendant if the EPA
91 Light, supra note 10, at 10,206 (citing United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envt'l L.
Rep. (Envt'l L. Inst.) 20,696 (D.S.C. 1984)); see also Lyons, supra note 6, at 310-11. For
example, Wade held that courts may impose liability on any generator who transports
waste to a site for all response costs at the site even if the site actually is contaminated by
another generator's hazardous waste. 577 F. Supp. at 1333.
92 Under section 107(a), the EPA can establish liability for "all costs of removal or
remedial action . . . not inconsistent with the national contingency plan." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
93 United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823,
850 (W.D. Mo. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986). The court
found that under section 107(a)(4)(a) of CERCLA, responsible parties are liable for "all
costs of removal or remedial action." Id.
94 17 Env't Rep. 779 (BNA) (Sept. 26, 1986).
95 For example, in United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 661 F. Supp. 1416
(W.D. Mo. 1987), the expected litigation fees for defendants ranged from $5 million to
$11 million for only the pre-trial portion of the case. Light, supra note 10, at 10,204
(citing papers filed by a generator-defendant).
96 Although section 104 of SARA states that the EPA cannot spend more than $2
million or 12 months cleaning up a site, section 9604(c)(1)(c) grants the EPA authority
to continue the response action using superfund money if it is "otherwise appropriate
and consistent with the remedial action to be taken." 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(1)(G) (1982 &
Supp. 1988).
This provision effectively "emasculate[s] the time and dollar limitations on section
104 expenditures. IfEPA is inclined to carry a response action beyond those limitations,
there seems to be little doubt that doing so would be considered 'appropriate and con-
sistent' with the response action underway." Roberts, supra note 6, at 607 n.41.
In addition, the EPA can also continue to use Fund resources if the EPA finds that:
"(i) continued response actions are immediately required to prevent, limit, or mitigate
an emergency, (ii) there is an immediate risk to public health or welfare or the environ-
ment, and (iii) such assistance will not otherwise be provided on a timely basis." 42
U.S.C. § 9604(c)(1)(A). In addition, the $2 million cap does not include investigative
costs or monitoring costs. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(1). These costs also often reach into the
millions. In any case, if the EPA exceeds the statutory limit, this does not effect the
EPAs ability to recover all response costs in a section 107 action. See supra note 10.
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acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its selection of a remedy.97 In
addition, there is a presumption of agency expertise and rational-
ity.98 Faced with such limitations, it is difficult to see how the court
could ever find for a defendant by reviewing an administrative rec-
ord composed largely by the EPA.99 John Quarles, former EPA
deputy administrator, agrees that SARA "thoroughly undercut[s]
the ability of a private party to successfully challenge decisions of
the government through judicial review." 100
b. Judicial Review Based On The Administrative Record Fails To
Protect: A Defendant's Right To Cost-Effective
Remedies. 101
Both SARA and the National Contingency Plan establish a de-
fendant's right to cost-effective remedial actions by the EPA. SARA
mandates that the EPA select a remedial plan "which provide[s] for
[a] cost effective response." 10 2
In United States v. Hardage,103 the government sought to limit
judicial review of its selected remedy10 4 to the administrative record,
and thus sought to shield its decision-making process from further
discovery.' 0 5 The district court refused to limit judicial review to
the administrative record, holding that such limited review "reeks of
unfairness."' 0 6 The district court reasoned that where the EPA
97 42 U.S.C. § 9613j)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
98 See International Harvester v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(recognizing that judicial review did not encompass "technical or policy redetermina-
tion"); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976) (courts should hold agencies to a minimum standard of rationality).
99 The argument that environmental expertise does not exist at the judicial level
highlights this point. See infra notes 116-27 and accompanying text. See infra notes 146-
53 and accompanying text for the argument that the EPA largely compiles the adminis-
trative record.
100 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 29 at 1182 (Nov. 14, 1986) (citing memorandum
largely written by John Quarles).
101 The National Contingency Plan requires that response actions be cost-effective.
42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(7) (1982 & Supp. 1988). The EPA, however, does not have a
history of cost-effective behavior. According to the Grace Commission's study on the
EPA, "the efficiency of contracting procedures could be improved at least 20 percent,"
and streamlining "could reduce program staff time and contract costs," saving up to
$62.9 million in three years. Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Agency Action: The Case of
Superfund, 1985 DUKE LJ. 261, 301 n.141 (quoting THE PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE SECTOR
SURVEY ON COST CONTROL, REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 32
(Spring-Fall 1983)). In addition, EPA cleanups cost an average of 30 to 40% more than
private cleanups of comparable quality. Id. at 302.
102 42 U.S.C. § 9621(a).
103 663 F. Supp. 1280 (W.D. Okl. 1987).
104 The EPA's selected remedy was injunctive relief pursuant to section 106 compel-
ling defendants to perform site cleanup. Id- at 1284.
105 Id. at 1283.
106 Id at 1287. The court initially refused to apply SARA retroactively, but analyzed
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seeks to force defendants to finance the EPA's remedial action
under section 106, fairness entitles defendants to a cost effective
remedy.'0 7 The Hardage court awarded de novo review of the EPA's
selected remedy stating:
[T]he private interest that will be affected by the official action, is
great. The defendants found liable will be ordered to implement a
remedy which may exceed $70 million in cost.... [T]he risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used . . . suggests a scope of review less than de novo would be
grossly unfair to defendants.' 08
Although, Hardage is a section 106 case, the issues are sufficiently
analogous to support the claim that the courts should not limit judi-
cial review to the administrative record in section 104 actions as
well. Additionally, the private interest at stake in a section 104 ac-,
tion is perhaps even greater than in a section 106 action given that
the EPA maintains control over the implementation process, and
defendants therefore lack the ability to ensure cost effective behav-
ior by the EPA.
c. Judicial Review Based On An Administrative Record Becomes A
Battle Of The Forms-A Battle In Which SARA Provides
PRPs With Few Or No Weapons.
Defendants can contribute to the administrative record during
the public comment period following publication of the EPA's Re-
medial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS). 10 9 The EPA must
also give notice to all PRPs and the public concerning proposed ac-
tion at a site, 1 "o and must allow for a public meeting."' In addition,
defendants can comment on the alternative remedies outlined by
the EPA, conduct their own RI/FS, and suggest proper remedial ac-
tion. However, SARA only requires that the EPA provide defend-
ants with "a reasonable opportunity to comment and provide
information regarding the plan;"' 12 that the EPA respond "to each
the judicial review issue "as though the court condone[d] retroactive application of
SARA." Id. at 1284.
107 Id. at 1285; see infra notes 128-38 and accompanying text for the argument that
this rationale equally applies to section 104 actions. In Haidage, the court reasoned:
De novo review of any recommended remedy which the government
seeks to impose on private parties effectively ensures its diligence in con-
sideration of all issues, including cost-effectiveness, since the government
knows the higher standard of review of such recommendation (de novo)
will be applied by the court.
Hardage, 663 F. Supp. at 1285.
108 Id. at 1290.
109 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (k)(B) (Supp. 1988).
110 Id. § 9613 (k)(B)(i).
1 Id. § 9613 (k)(B)(iii).
112 Id. § 9613 (k)(B)(ii).
1166 [Vol. 74:1152
1989] LIMITING JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER SARA
of the significant comments, criticisms, and new data submitted in
written or oral presentations;" ' 1 3 and that the EPA provide a "state-
ment of the basis and purpose of the selected action." 114 SARA
does not specify any requirements, however, regarding the nature,
form, or substance of the EPA's responses to a defendant's com-
ments. Additionally, SARA fails to limit the discretion of the EPA in
selecting a remedial plan, because it does not specify the time, con-
sideration, or weight to be given to alternative remedial plans of
PRPs or other interested parties.1 15 Consequently, SARA promotes
formalism at the expense of substance. Given the presumption of
agency expertise under an arbitrary and capricious standard, de-
fendants cannot wage war against excessive action by the fully-
armed EPA in a battle of the forms.
2. Environmental Expertise Does Not Exist At The Judicial Level
Given the absence of environmental expertise at the judicial
level, the only way to guard against unreasonable decision-making
by the EPA is to provide adequate procedural safeguards which cre-
ate incentives for the EPA to act reasonably and intelligently." 16
Cross-examination at the trial level is one such procedural safe-
guard. Cross-examination not only serves to improve administra-
tive decision-making in the long run, but also aids an inexperienced
judiciary in understanding the complex data presented in the ad-
ministrative record.
In Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 1 7 the Court recognized its duty to make a
searching and careful review of the administrative record."18 How-
ever, "no other field of public regulation requires such a complex
balancing of so many subtle relationships." ' "19 The court confessed
the inability ofjudges to comprehend fully the decision-making pro-
113 Id. § 9613 (k)(B)(iv).
114 Id. § 9613 (k)(B)(v).
115 SARA, however, does require the EPA to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of pro-
posed alternative remedial actions. Section 121 provides in pertinent part: "In evaluat-
ing the cost effectiveness of proposed alternative remedial actions, the President shall
taken into account the total short- and long-term costs of such actions, including the
costs of operation and maintenance for the entire period during which such activities
will be required." Id. § 9621.
116 See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
117 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
118 Id. at 36-37. In Ethyl Corp., plaintiffs sought judicial review of an EPA order man-
dating the annual reduction of the lead content of leaded gasoline. The court held that
the EPA's determination that lead emissions posed a serious threat of harm to the public
health was not arbitrary and capricious despite the lack of proof of actual harm and
scientific certainty. Id at 20-23. The court emphasized that it had a narrowly defined
duty of holding agencies to a minimal standard of rationality. Id. at 36.
119 Oakes, supra note 68, at 502.
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cess of the EPA. 120 The court, however, failed to recognize that this
inherent complexity of environmental issues precludes a "searching
and careful" review of the record by a judiciary with little or no
training in the environmental field. The fact that environmental
cases rarely go to trial and often are settled increases the likelihood
that the judiciary will not gain the necessary experience and scien-
tific skill sitting on the bench. There is simply no way for an inexpe-
rienced court to engage in anything more than formalistic review
without the benefits of procedures which illuminate the issues and
facts.
In International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, ChiefJudge Bazelon
claimed that "environmental litigation represents a 'new era' in ad-
ministrative law." 12' Judge Bazelon recognized his own inability
substantively to review environmental decisions and argued that in
order to guard against unreasonable administrative decisions,
courts must require procedures "that open the Administrator's deci-
sion to challenge and force him to respond."1 22 In short, Judge
Bazelon acknowledged that because judges cannot engage in mean-
ingful substantive review, only sufficient process can ensure rea-
soned decision-making by the EPA.' 23
Additionally, because remedial plans are site specific and neces-
sitate a case-by-case approach, the judiciary cannot rely on prece-
dent when reviewing the EPA's selected remedy. This poses
difficulty for ajudge who is faced with a highly scientific administra-
tive record in a dispute over appropriate remedial action at a site.
The process of remedy selection illustrates why precedent is
unavailable to a reviewing judge. Before selecting a remedial plan
for a site, the EPA must conduct a Remedial Investiga-
tion/Feasibility Study which suggests alternative remedies for the
site.124 Although defendants can conduct their own studies and can
comment on the EPA's RI/FS, the EPA alone ultimately determines
the appropriate remedy. In section 107 cost-recovery actions by the
120 Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 36.
121 International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Bazelon, CJ., concurring) ("[Tihe interests at stake in this case are too important to be
resolved on the basis of traditional administrative labels.").
122 Id at 652.
123 Id. As Judge Bazelon explains:
[I]n cases of great technological complexity, the best way for courts to
guard against unreasonable or erroneous administrative decisions is not
for the judges themselves to scrutinize the technical merits of each deci-
sion. Rather, it is to establish a decision-making process which assures a
reasoned decision that can be held up to the scrutiny of the scientific
community and the public.
Id.
124 See supra note 5.
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EPA, a defendant is likely to argue that the EPA implemented an
unnecessarily expansive remedial plan. 125 Remedial responses,
however, are "highly site specific, involving widely divergent physical situ-
ations, environmental media that are contaminated, and chemistry
of the contaminants.'" 126 Thus, judges cannot rely on precedent in
determining the rationality of the EPA's remedial action. 127
Consequently, judges must rely on personal knowledge of the
environmental field to conduct a "searching and careful" review.
Unfortunately, as previousely discussed, judges lack the expertise to
engage in any form of meaningful review given the many technical
and scientific dimensions to an environmental decision. This inabil-
ity to understand the EPA's decision-making process prevents
judges from protecting defendants against harsh remedial decisions.
3. The EPA Lacks Incentive To Act In A Cost Effective Manner In
Section 104 Actions
In United States v. Conservation Chemical Co. 128 and United States v.
Hardage,129 the district courts ruled that in section 106 actions where
the EPA seeks injunctive relief to compel defendants to perform site
cleanup, the court is not limited to the administrative record. How-
ever, in section 104 cost recovery actions, the court is limited to the
administrative record.130 The courts provide two primary reasons
for this distinction: (1) SARA specifically provides that judicial re-
view is limited to the administrative record only when the President,
not the court, takes action; 131 and (2) in section 104 cost recovery
actions where the government is initially paying for cleanup, there is
incentive for the government to act in a cost effective manner. 132
Therefore, the courts have determined that there is less need for
discovery in section 104 actions.
125 See United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 669 F. Supp. 672, 677 (D.N.J. 1987) (de-
fendants argued for de novo review because of their financial interest in the cost-effec-
tiveness of the EPA's response action); United States v. Dickerson, 660 F. Supp. 227
(M.D. Ga. 1987) (responsible parties alleged EPA's remedial plan was not cost-effective).
126 18 Env't Rep., supra note 55, at 773 (July 10, 1987) (paraphrasing report by ERT,
Inc., an environmental consulting firm) (emphasis added).
127 See Oakes, supra note 68, at 504. According to Oakes:
[E]nvironmental law has proven more resistant to [the] process of com-
mon law development; cases instead have tended to turn on particular
facts and on the subjective attitudes of those making the decisions. ...
[W]hat are called 'legal' decisions in the environmental field are often
factual decisions and hence unlikely to yield useful precedent."
Id.
128 661 F. Supp. 1416 (W.D. Mo. 1987).
129 663 F. Supp. 1280 (W.D. Okla. 1987).
130 Conservation Chem. Co., 661 F. Supp. at 1429; Hardage, 663 F. Supp. at 1284.
131 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (j)(1) (Supp. 1988).
132 Hardage, 663 F. Supp. at 1285.
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The court's first justification as to the empowering language is
merely a question of semantics.' 33 The second rationale, on the
other hand, evidences the court's concern about the cost-effective-
ness of a remedial action. For example, the district court in Hardage
refused to limit judicial review to the administrative record in a sec-
tion 106 action because the court did not believe the EPA had incen-
tive to act in a cost-effective manner when defendants must initially
finance the remedial action selected by the EPA. 13 4 This lack of in-
centive, however, also exists in a section 104 action. Although the
government provides the initial funding in a section 104 action, it is
doing so with the knowledge that it can seek recovery of all of its
expenses in a subsequent cost-recovery suit.13 5 Indeed, the govern-
ment also knows that the arbitrary and capricious standard places a
heavy burden on a party challenging its remedial choice. It there-
fore is unlikely that the agency has any incentive to act in a cost
effective manner.13 6 While it is possible the EPA may not recover all
of its response costs from PRPs, t37 "the pressure on EPA to show
results will cause it to spend more money... [and] the tightening of
cleanup standards [under SARA] 'will further encourage a Cadillac
133 The semantics dilemma is due to contradictory language in the statute. Section
9613()(1) states thatjudicial review shall be limited to the administrative record in "any
judicial action under this Act." 42 U.S.C. § 96130)(1) (Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
The same section immediately thereafter states that judicial review shall be limited to
the administrative record when a response action is "taken or ordered by the President."
42 U.S.C. § 96130)(1) (Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
134 Id. The defendants in Hardage sought information from site contractors that was
not in the administrative record. For a summary of the Hardage case, see 17 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 34 at 1414 (Dec. 19, 1986).
135 Under CERCLA, PRPs are responsible for "all costs of removal or remedial ac-
tion incurred by the United States Government." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1982 &
Supp. 1988). Courts consistently have held that section 107 liability is independant of
the requirements of section 104. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619
F. Supp. 162, 207 (D.C. Mo. 1985); New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291,
303 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1336 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
Perhaps another safeguard against excessive EPA spending is 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (k)
which provides in pertinent part: "In each fiscal year, the Inspector General ... shall
conduct an annual audit of all payments, obligations, reimbursements, or other uses of
the Fund in the prior fiscal year, to assure that the Fund is being properly administered .... 42
U.S.C. § 9611(k) (emphasis added). The effectiveness of this check on agency action
depends in large part on how the Inspector General interprets "properly administered."
Arguably, this section could prevent the expenditure of funds in excess of the $2 million
limit, but then only in those cases where such excess spending is not authorized by the
statute. See supra note 96.
136 Of course, the Superfund is not an unlimited resource, and the EPA must take
into consideration the availability of funds when remedying a site. But this does not
guarantee the EPA will act cost-effectively. It simply means that the EPA might act more
cost-effectively than if the fund was not capped at all.
137 The House Appropriations Committee has criticized the EPA for failing to ac-
tively pursue PRPs. 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 48 at 2363 (March 25, 1988) (summarizing
the House staff report). According to EPA Administrator Lee M. Thomas, "[w]here
we've fallen down is pressing litigation [to recover funds] in the courtroom." Id.
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approach to remedial action decisions.' "138 In sum, there is little
incentive for the EPA to conduct efficient cleanups in both section
104 and section 106 actions. Accordingly, the courts should not
limit judicial review to the administrative record in section 104 ac-
tions for the same reasons they do not limit review in section 106
actions.
The fact that EPA has not acted in a cost-effective manner dur-
ing other phases of the remedial process lends support to the asser-
tion that EPA does not have a cost-effective disposition. The
inadequate monitoring of contractors, 139 the lack of competition
among contractors seeking remedial work from the EPA, 140 the
EPA's own admission of its uncertainty over the role of cost, 14 1 and
reports that the EPA has sued "deep pockets" for hazardous waste
cleanup "where the agency should have been pursuing 'sound and
practical' remedies to site problems" illustrate EPA's inefficient his-
tory. 142 Furthermore, the $2,000,000 or 12 month limit on EPA re-
sponse actions under section 104 has proved futile as a limit on
agency spending, 143 and the courts always have held that failure to
comply with the requirements of section 104 does not affect the
EPA's ability to collect all response costs under section 107.144
These criticisms reveal that the EPA is an unorganized bureaucracy
lacking the manpower and structure to make intelligent and cost ef-
fective decisions concerning appropriate remedial action for each
Superfund site.145 More importantly, Congress has simply stood
138 17 Env't Rep., supra note 100, at 1182 (Nov. 14, 1986) (citing a memorandum by
attorneys with the Washington, D.C. law firm of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius).
139 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 1 at 4 (May 1, 1987).
140 See 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 6 at 494-95 (June 5, 1987) (noting that the lack of
competition among contractors hired at the state level increases the cost of EPA clean-
ups). As a result of this lack of competition, contractors have engaged in excessive cost
markups leading to an increase in cost of cleanups. See 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 8 at 4
(May 1, 1987). For example, in one case, emergency contractors charged approximately
$16 per hour for the use of a two inch trash pump. This equalled a markup of 16,000
percent from 10 cents an hour. Id.
141 18 Env't Rep., supra note 59, at 667 (citing Arthur B. Weissman, director of the
policy and analysis staff in the EPA's Office of Emergency and Remedial Response).
SARA does not define "permanent" remedy, nor does SARA provide adequate instruc-
tions on the role of cost-effectiveness in cleanup decisions. 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 26
at 962-63 (Oct. 24, 1986).
142 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 17 at 609 (Aug. 22, 1986) (citing a speech to the Ameri-
can Bar Association by Leonard L. Rivkin, a partner in Rivkin, Radler, Dunne, & Bayh).
For an example of the EPA's failure to pursue sound and practical remedies to a site, see
infra note 145.
143 See supra note 96.
144 See United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
145 According to a BNA staff correspondent, a report written by Inspector General
for Region III, P. Ronald Gandolfo, claimed that "'overzealous' remedial actions and
lax monitoring of contractors ... delayed cleanups at half of 20 Pennsylvania superfund
sites." 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) at 1758 (Nov. 20, 1987) (paraphrasing the Gandolfo re-
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back and watched.
4. SARA 's Hearing Requirements Do Not Adequately Protect a
Defendant's Due Process Rights
a. PRPs Do Not Have An Adequate Opportunity To Contribute
To The Administrative Record.
While the EPA can take as much time as it needs to perform a
Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) and select a re-
sponse action, PRPs generally have only a few months to study the
EPA's proposed remedies and perform their own investigations.146
Although SARA requires that the EPA give defendants a "reason-
able opportunity" to comment on the EPA's RI/FS, 47 it does not
impose any time limit on the completion of an RI/FS by the EPA.
The EPA, in fact, generally takes an average of 2.5 years to complete
an RI/FS. 48 Given that the RI/FS constitutes a large, and certainly
major, part of the administrative record, this lack of equal participa-
tion power results in an administrative record compiled largely by
the EPA.149 In such a situation, it is difficult to argue that SARA
port). According to the report, the EPA designated two sites on the NPL as requiring
major remedial action which only required ordinary removal actions involving less time
and money. Id. at 1759. According to the report, "inaccurate, incomplete, or questiona-
ble information" caused this error. Id. (quoting the Gandolfo report). The report also
noted that a third Pennsylvania site listed on the NPL, East Mount Zion, may not have
contained any hazardous substances at all. Id.
146 For example, in United States v. Hardage, the EPA gave PRPs only 45 days to con-
duct their own RI/FS and comment on the EPA's study. 663 F. Supp. 1280, 1289 (W.D.
Okla. 1987). The court held that this violated due process, and determined that de novo
review of the agency's proposed remedy was appropriate. Id. at 1290. In United States v.
Rohm &Haas Co., the EPA also gave defendants only 45 days to submit their proposals in
response to the EPA's plan. 669 F. Supp. 672, 682 (D.N.J. 1987). The court remanded
the case back to the agency because the EPA failed to satisfy the administrative require-
ments of SARA. Id. at 683. However, the court cautioned that "[i]t is not immediately
obvious.., what this court's response should be in light of the identified deficiencies in
the administrative process.... There is support.., in SARA [for plaintiff's proposition
that judicial review be based on the administrative record already compiled by the
EPA]." Id. Therefore, it is not obvious that the courts will automatically remand cases
where the EPA did not give defendants a reasonable opportunity to comment on a pro-
posed remedy. Other problems include defining what is a "reasonable opportunity to
comment," and determining the adequacy of SARA's judicial review provisions when
the EPA joins additional PRPs following the participation process. See id. at 684 (the
court recognized the latter problem but did not reach the issue).
147 42 U.S.C. § 9613(k)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. 1988).
148 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 51 at 2129-30 (April 17, 1987) (citingJudith Wong,
chief of the superfund enforcement section, EPA Region VIII).
149 Although placement of a site on the NPL may alert PRPs of agency action early
on, listing of a site does not indicate that the EPA will take immediate remedial action.
The EPA is overburdened due to the large numbers of hazardous waste sites needing
cleanup and EPA lacks the resources to respond quickly to each site. See Frost, Strict
Liability as an Incentive for Cleanup of Contaminated Property, 25 Hous. L. REv. 951, 958
(1988). There may be as many as 425,380 potential Superfund sites in the United States
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ensures that PRPs have an adequate opportunity "to submit an ef-
fective presentation."15 0
For example, in Hardage, the EPA spent four years assembling
its case against defendants, but provided the defendants with only
forty-five days to investigate the site and "develop data to prove the
conclusions in EPA's Feasibility Study were incorrect." 151 In order
to gather sufficient data to allege innaccuracies in the EPA's study,
defendant's spent over $1.5 million and six months worth of investi-
gation. 152 On these facts, the court ordered de novo review of the
EPA's remedy selection. 153
b. The Procedural Requirements Of SARA Do Not Encourage The
EPA To Evaluate Fully And Adequately All Remedial
Action Alternatives, Including Those Proposed By
PRPs.
Courts assume that the procedural requirements of SARA en-
courage the EPA to evaluate fully and adequately all remedial action
alternatives, including those proposed by PRPs. This, however, is
not the case. For example, in Hardage, the EPA utilized the same
staff persons to perform the RI/FS, consider the alternative reme-
dial options, select the final remedial plan, and evaluate the com-
ments made by PRPs. 154 The court held that this was a "flagrant
denial of due process."'' 55 In other words, the court recognized that
the formal requirements of SARA alone do not satisfy the require-
ments of due process. In the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction,
the court held that under the circumstances as outlined above, "a
scope of review less than de novo would be grossly unfair to
defendants."156
Perhaps more importantly, SARA imposes meaningless limits
on the EPA's discretion in selecting between alternative remedial
plans. SARA only requires the EPA to respond to the significant
data submitted by PRPs. SARA, however, does not prescribe the
standards by which EPA is to judge remedial plans proposed by
PRPs; nor does SARA dictate the weight the EPA is to give such
today. Id. (citing G.A.O. Finds 425,380 Potential Superfund Sites; Florio Hits E.P.A. For Delays
in Site Assessments, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2043 (1988)).
150 In Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, the court held that an adequate hearing provides
parties a full opportunity "to submit an effective presentation." 477 F.2d 495, 503 (4th
Cir. 1973).
151 Hardage, 663 F. Supp. at 1289.
152 ld
153 Id at 1290.
154 Id. ("Due process dictates separation of the prosecutorial function from the deci-
sion-making function.").
155 Id. (quoting defendants).
156 Id
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plans. Consequently, the EPA maintains significant control over the
selection process.
c. Courts Erroneously Assume That The Hearing Requirements Of
SARA Afford Defendants An Opportunity to Submit An
Effective Presentation.
SARA's hearing requirements do not afford defendants an op-
portunity to submit an effective presentation. In United States v. Sey-
mour Recycling Corp.1 57 the court recognized that due process
requires that defendants have an opportunity to comment on the
EPA's proposals "at a meaningful time, in a meaningful manner."' 58
The court assumed that because defendants had the opportunity to
comment on the EPA's RI/FS and to perform their own studies, de-
fendants had access to all the information necessary to satisfy due
process requirements. 159 While it is true that defendants had an op-
portunity to comment on the EPA's RI/FS prior to EPA's final selec-
tion of a remedy, this procedure by itself hardly satisfies the
requirement that defendants comment "in a meaningful manner."
SARA only requires the EPA to respond to a party's comments or
criticisms. 160 SARA does not require full consideration by the EPA
of a party's comments; nor does SARA specify the nature, form, or
substance of the EPA's responses to such comments. In essence,
SARA's hearing requirements "leave open the possibility that the
government will require the most onerous level of pristine
cleanup."' 161 In the end, the EPA alone decides the appropriate
remedy, subject only to an arbitrary and capricious standard of re-
view. Without the benefit of cross-examination, defendants cannot
rebut the presumption of agency expertise and will rarely be able to
prove the EPA acted arbitrarily or capriciously.16 2
157 679 F. Supp. 859 (S.D. Ind. 1987).
158 In Seymour Recycling, the United States sought a court ruling that if the defendants
challenged the EPA's selected remedy, judicial review would be limited to the adminis-
trative record according to Section 113(j) of SARA, Seymour Recycling, 679 F. Supp. at
861. Defendants argued that a de novo trial was necessary to satisfy due process re-
quirements. Id. at 864. The court denied defendants claim, stating that defendants had
the necessary information to comment on the EPA's proposed remedies "in a meaning-
ful manner." Id.
The court in Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA also recognized that hearings should pro-
vide defendants an "opportunity to submit an effective presentation." 477 F.2d 495, 503
(4th Cir. 1973) (quoting Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 499 F.2d 1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir.
1971)). In addition, the court held that if" 'cross-examination on the crucial issues' is
found proper, such right should be recognized and upheld." Id. The court therefore
acknowledged therefore, that merely affording PRPs the opportunity to comment on the
EPA's proposals may not enable them to sufficiently present their objections. Id.
159 Seymor Recycling, 679 F. Supp. at 864-65.
160 42 U.S.C. § 9613(k)(2)(B)(iv) (Supp. 1988).
161 Frost, supra note 149, at 959.
162 See 2 Inside Litigation, No. 1, at 4 (Nov. 1987) [hereinafter Inside Litigation] (In this
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C. Proposal For Reform
Whenever additional procedural safeguards are given to a de-
fendant, time and money become important issues. Although some
cases involving judicial review of agency action have engaged in de
novo review of agency decision-making, 163 this can be an enor-
mously expensive process. Litigation involves both transaction and
opportunity costs. 64 In environmental litigation, there is a public
interest in expediting the litigation process and in minimizing the
financial strain on Superfund. For these reasons, this Note does not
advocate de novo review of agency decision-making. However, pro-
tecting the public interest at the expense of the rights of potentially
responsible parties reeks of unfairness. By affording PRPs addi-
tional procedural protection through cross-examination of their op-
position during the cost-recovery action following clean up,' 65 the
courts can serve justice without unduly burdening the EPA and the
Superfund. More importantly, the courts will be fulfilling their con-
stitutional duty to provide due process of law.
Although cross-examination at the public hearing stage, before
the EPA takes remedial action, would provide PRP's with the oppor-
tunity to determine weaknesses in the agency's case and might cre-
ate incentives for the EPA to act in an intelligent, orderly, and cost
effective manner, providing judicial review at this stage is a time-
consuming process. Due to the inherent dangers posed by hazard-
ous waste sites and the public interest in expediting the cleanup of
these sites, time is of the essence. Therefore, cross-examination at
this stage would be counter-productive to the main goals of CER-
CLA and SARA. In any case, all of the above advantages of cross-
article Stanley Brown, defense counsel for International Minerals & Chemical Corp.,
said: "In [United States v. Otati & Goss, Inc.], we have demonstrated that the EPA has no
expertise, or that they've misapplied it. Under SARA, there will be an assumption that
they are experts and no way to prove otherwise."). In Ottati & Goss, 630 F. Supp. 1361
(D.N.H. 1985), the court allowed defendants to cross-examine the EPA's expert witness
and contractor. See also International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651-
52 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (recognizing that "[w]hether or not traditional administrative rules
require it .... this decision requires at the least a carefully limited right of cross-exami-
nation at the hearing and an opportunity to challenge the assumptions and methodology
underlying the [EPA's] decision.").
163 See United States v. Hardage, 663 F.Supp. 1280 (W.D. Okla. 1986) (the court
engaged in de novo review in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction).
164 For a discussion of the transactions and opportunity costs involved in hazardous
waste litigation, see Lyons, supra note 7, at 271.
165 See International Harvester, 478 F.2d at 631 (recognizing the advantage of cross-
examination as an "engine of truth" and therefore, "a right of cross-examination, con-
sistent with time limitations, might well extend to particular cases of need, on critical
points where the general procedure proved inadequate to probe 'soft' and sensitive sub-
jects and witnesses.").
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examination can be realized in an adjudicatory hearing following
cleanup.
Providing the opportunity to cross-examine EPA personnel and
expert witnesses following cleanup does not violate the express pur-
poses and concerns of CERCLA and SARA. On the contrary, it cre-
ates incentives for the EPA to act efficiently and in accordance with
the requirements of the National Contingency Plan.' 66 Although
one could argue that cross-examination will increase the transaction
and opportunity costs of environmental litigation, cross-examina-
tion also will create efficiencies that will offset any initial costs. For
example, because cross-examination will act as a check on the cost-
effectiveness of the EPA's actions, it will create incentives for the
EPA to be highly selective in choosing among remedial alternatives.
This may in turn prevent the unnecessary expenditure of funds and
will serve to protect the integrity of Superfund.
Consequently, cross-examination will have the long term effect
of encouraging the EPA to engage in reasoned decision-making. As
Judge Bazelon adamantly asserts, "we will do more to improve ad-
ministrative decision-making by concentrating our efforts on
strengthening administrative procedures."'' 67 Because cross-exami-
nation will act as a check on agency behavior, this will force the EPA
to improve remedial selection procedures. In turn, this will increase
the quality of the EPA's decision-making process which will enable
judges to comprehend more fully the administrative record in order
to make determinations of arbitrariness and capriciousness.1 68
Cross-examination also serves to protect the due process rights
of PRPs. In Mathews v. Eldridge,169 the Supreme Court held that a
determination of due process depends on a consideration of three
factors: (1) the private interest involved; (2) the probable value of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards if there is a risk of an
erroneous deprivation of a private interest through the procedures
used; and (3) the public interest involved, including the fiscal and
administrative burdens resulting from additional or substitute pro-
cedural requirements. 70
The first factor to consider under Mathews is the private inter-
166 See supra note 55 for an explanation of the requirements of the NCP.
167 Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 67 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Bazelon, CJ., concur-
ring), cert denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
168 While this Note agrees with Judge Bazelon's procedure based approach to judi-
cial review, it disagrees with his belief that judges should not engage in any substantive
review at all. Judges can engage in limited substantive review to determine arbitrariness
and capriciousness if there are adequate procedures to illuminate the complex data in
environmental cases.
169 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
170 Id. at 335.
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est. In section 104 actions followed by cost recovery, the private
interest of PRPs is financial given the enormous liability expo-
sure.17' Analysis under the second Mathews factor indicates that the
formalistic requirements of SARA provide no actual, substantive
protection of a defendant's rights against unreasonable agency be-
havior. Given the high risk of an erroneous deprivation of a defend-
ant's interest in cost-effective remedies, cross-examination is a
valuable procedural tool which will act as a check on agency behav-
ior, allow defendents to question the EPA's expertise, serve to cre-
ate incentives for the EPA to act in a cost-effective manner, and aid
the judiciary in understanding the remedial selection and imple-
mentation processes.
Finally, consideration of the public interest factor indicates that
the governmental burdens resulting from this additional procedural
requirement following cleanup will be minimal compared to the pri-
vate interests at stake. Because cross-examination will take place fol-
lowing cleanup, it will not affect the overwhelming public interest in
prompt and effective responses. Rather, cross-examination serves
the public interest by creating incentives for the EPA to act intelli-
gently and efficiently in the cleanup of hazardous waste sites. 172
Cost-effective behavior by the EPA will allow the EPA to stretch its
time and money over a greater number of sites needing immediate
cleanup. t 73 Overzealous remedial action by the EPA only serves to
171 The astronomical costs of cleanup have caused PRPs to seek insurance coverage
in order to insulate themselves against liability. See Murphy, The Impact of "Superfund"
and Other Environmental Statutes on Commercial Lending and Investment Activities, 41 Bus. LAw
1133 (1986). Insurance companies, however, have attempted to narrow their policies to
restrict coverage and minimize their risk. Note, Taking the Insurers to the Dumps: Interpret-
ing "Damages"--Is There Coveragefor Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs Under Comprehensive Gen-
eral Liability Insurance?, 13J. CORP. L. 1101, 1104-05 (1988). A great deal of controversy
still exists as to whether cleanup costs, such as those imposed under SARA, are covered
under Comprehensive General Liability policies. Id. at 1105-07. The potential inability
to obtain insurance coverage places a PRP in an even more precarious position. See
generally Brett, Insuring Against the Innovative Liabilities and Remedies Created by Superfund, 6
UCLAJ. ENmrL. L. & POL'Y 1 (1986) (discussing Superfund liability provisions and how
liability insurance policy language and public policy place Superfund liability outside
scope of coverage).
172 For example, in United States v. Ottati & Goss, 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H.
1985), cross-examination helped demonstrate that the EPA contractor had violated the
EPA's formal guidelines in preparing the Remedial Investigation/Feasibility study, and
gave defendants an opportunity to show the EPA's lack of expertise. Inside Litigation,
supra note 167, at 4 (summarizing the procedural aspects of the case and the effect of
SARA on PRPs). In particular, the EPA did not evaluate the probability of certain events
occurring. Id. Therefore, the threat of cross-examination in future cases should en-
courage the EPA to avoid the embarrassments of Ottati & Goss.
173 In Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, plaintiffs argued that the EPA should not un-
necessarily exhaust the Superfund on one site, but rather should efficiently utilize it on
as many dangerous sites as possible. 600 F. Supp. 1487, 1488 (D.N.J. 1985).
1177
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
unnecessarily deplete Superfund resources and prevent EPA per-
sonnel from engaging in other important environmental projects.
CONCLUSION
This Note does not intend to undermine the compelling inter-
est of protecting the environment nor to give pardon to companies
that recklessly dump hazardous waste in disregard of human health
and the environment. Rather, this Note recognizes that justice re-
quires that we protect the interests of companies involved in hazard-
ous waste litigation to the same extent that we protect the due
process rights of every American citizen. As the law stands today,
the actions of the EPA threaten the existence of our most valuable
and productive American companies. Given the EPA's history of
inefficiency, mismanagement, and questionable conduct, there must
be a check placed on this agency's power. Perhaps one day the EPA
will have the structure, expertise, and manpower to deal effectively
and efficiently with the problems of hazardous waste. Until then, we
must act to preserve two valuable resources: American industry and
the environment.
Kristin M. Carter
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